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Abstract: The current upswing of right-wing populism in the United States and in Europe is a 
challenge not only for policy makers, but also for journalism theory. If and how to report on right-
wing politicians, movements and issues is a delicate question that various strands of theory answer 
differently. Functionalist systems theory is in favor of large-scale coverage due to the stimulating 
news values of populist debates, although the precise character of the political integration remains 
unclear. In contrast, rational democratic deliberation theory is to be interpreted as a complete re-
buttal of the irrational character of populism. The argument here would be that we must not allow 
the media be dominated by irrational debates. At the same time, democratic media theory is all but 
uniform in dealing with the phenomenon. While traditional rational public sphere theory is clearly 
anti-populist, paradoxically left-liberal and postmodern public sphere theory, anti-elitist and radi-
cally post-modern as it is, can be used as an argument for better representation of marginalized 
voices, including right-wing populists. 
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Introduction  
 
In recent times, we have seen massive media coverage of right-wing populist fig-
ures, parties and movements in countries like the United States, the United King-
dom or in other parts of Europe. Donald Trump, the Brexit movement, the German 
right-wing “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), or the French Front National are 
among the most well-known examples. Reporting on populism, however, is a dou-
ble-edged sword. On the one hand, it is needed as a way of scrutinizing potentially 
dangerous movements that seek to transform liberal into hegemonic democracy by 
restricting constitutional rights of minorities and even the press. On the other 
hand, intensive media attention seems to make these movements appear bigger 
than they actually are and helps them set the public agenda. Trump was the only 
Republican presidential candidate with a significant worldwide resonance when he 
was still a marginal opponent long before he became an elected president. “Brexit” 
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echoed like drumbeats in the British tabloid press – a fact that surely secured the 
final minimal lead in the national referendum on Britain’s membership in the Eu-
ropean Union. In Germany, the right-wing protest movement “Pegida” in the East 
German town of Dresden received so much media coverage that it seemed like a 
nation-wide phenomenon during a time when large numbers of refugees came to 
Germany. A critical German TV feature counted about forty talk shows in 2017 
which had dealt with the refugee issue – while none was, for example, produced on 
the German car emissions fraud scandal.1 The populist agenda dominates our me-
dia – even when the media are being critical. 
 
How do we explain the massive media attention given to right-wing movements in 
Europe and the United States? Is it simple capitalist sensationalism as part of a 
symbiotic relationship with the populist urge for prominence? Having talked to 
many German journalists it seems to me that there is a widespread insecurity 
about professional ethics when it comes to the new phenomenon of mainstream 
right-wing populism. Clarifying the issue from the perspective of journalism theory 
is, in fact, rather complicated. There is not only a deep gulf between functionalist 
and democratic theories concerning the role of media in the public sphere. Demo-
cratic deliberation and public sphere theory are also in themselves contradictory 
and sometimes confusing. Practical journalists and communication scientists alike 
are in dire need of an update in professional ethics. 
 
 
Functionalist theory 
 
According to the German system theoretician Niklas Luhmann, “systems” are de-
fined on the basis of differences created with regard to social environments (Luh-
mann 1975, 194). The mass media, he argues, have autonomous functions that de-
fine their right to exist. Luhmann says that the primary function of media is to re-
duce complexity. Through processes of gatekeeping they structure the world and 
set the agenda for society. The media discourse enables co-orientation among peo-
ple: we talk about the same issues and share perspectives that help us understand 
and interpret the world. In this sense, the media also contribute to the integration 
of people into society. We are all part of a certain mainstream discourse that, one 
way or the other, synchronizes our worldviews.  
 
It is not so important for co-orientation and integration whether media focus on 
political news or on entertainment. Luhmann argues that the function of media is 
actually to enable communication with “strangers” of whatever kind (Ger-
hards/Neidhardt 1990, 16). Functionalist systems theory is somehow related to 
Marshal McLuhan’s “The medium is the message” paradigm (1964). McLuhan 
proposes that a medium itself, not the content it carries, affects society. In this 
                                                 
1 „Talkshows: Bühne frei für Populisten“, Monitor, Das Erste, 19 January 2017, 
http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/video-talkshows-buehne-frei-fuer-populisten-
100.html. 
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sense, the mass character of big media might be more important than their actual 
output. 
 
News value theory, as the main neoliberal explanatory theory for the agenda selec-
tion practiced by modern media, is just another expression of the idea that the me-
dium itself owns “values”. Even those who believe that news values are not deter-
mined by the medium argue that values are defined by the journalists as individu-
als or as professional groups (Staab 1990). Such an argument is also related to the 
more leftist post-structuralist or post-modernist version of radical constructivism 
(von Glasersfeld 1984). Functionalism, news value theory and radical constructiv-
ism allow for maximum toleration of all kinds of media output, as long as the mass 
character of the media is guaranteed, large audiences are created, and the media 
thereby co-orientate and integrate people and society. 
 
It is not necessary to say that the massive coverage of right-wing populism can be 
explained by its almost perfect fit with a large number of news values – for exam-
ple, personalization, conflict, emotion, visibility or entertainment. Such factors 
make it an ideal candidate for functionalist, neoliberal or post-modernist journal-
ism approaches. Right-wing populism is a massive stimulation of the political sys-
tem, for co-orientation and the re-integration of people and society. It is an reac-
tionary and revolutionary challenge at the same time. Populism subscribes to 
democratic values, but it seeks to transform “liberal” into “hegemonial” societies, 
or into what Alexis de Tocqueville called the “dictatorship of the majority” (de 
Tocqueville 1985, 145f.). Since, as Gerhards and Neidhardt argue, the political sys-
tem is the only super system with general competences (1990, 8f.), massive politi-
cal changes are ideal stimuli for a complete re-programming of the media dis-
course and for co-orientation and re-integration of society. At a time when many 
people have abstained from politics and voting, populism has the potential to rein-
tegrate populations into a common discourse community, even if beyond the mere 
orientation towards the same agenda, “cultural wars” between leftists, liberals and 
rightists are on the rise. Re-integration does not necessarily happen in the sense 
that people become more right-wing and democracies more illiberal or even au-
thoritarian. As one can observe in Europe, right-wing populism mobilizes not only 
reactionary but also liberal and international forces. After Brexit and Trump’s suc-
cess, elections in 2016 in the Netherlands, Austria and France strengthened liberal 
political parties. 
 
However, when populism echoes like drumbeats in the neighboring media system, 
the long-term effects of such coverage remain unclear. The media might stabilize 
or destabilize our political systems. The functionalist neoliberal coverage of right-
wing populism is certainly integrative since it stimulates new political debates and 
co-orientation, but the precise character of the new integration remains unclear. 
Functionalist media define the Zeitgeist, but they also add an element of insecurity 
and chaos to the political system. In other words: one cannot control populist ef-
fects on democratic systems. 
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Democratic deliberation theory 
 
As a consequence, not only German system theoreticians have been arguing since 
the 1990s that radical constructivism is not a sufficient theoretical basis for jour-
nalism (Boventer 1992). The medium, in their view, is not the message. They clari-
fy that, although many radical constructivists resort to Niklas Luhmann’s radical 
functionalist systems theory, systems theory as such can also be in tune with “ob-
jectivity”, which is obviously a concept in sharp contrast to radical constructivism. 
Luhmann’s shift away from Talcott Parsons’ structuralism to post-structuralist 
functionalism is not universal in system theory. Parsons acknowledged the influ-
ence of “environments” on systems through processes of “adaptation” (Parsons 
1950). From the perspective of the media system, the political, economic or scien-
tific systems are such environments. In the same sense, scholars like Sandra Ball-
Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur also speak of “media dependencies” (Ball-
Rokeach/DeFleur 1976). All these approaches argue that media coverage is not on-
ly autonomous but also interactive with, and adaptive to, the perceptions of reality 
held by others that pose structural constraints. 
 
My argument here is as follows: the dialectic between functionalist autonomy and 
structural dependency forces systems into realistic, or better, “intersubjective” 
views of the world. We usually call this “objectivity” in journalism. It is exactly in 
the field of objectivity where systems theory can meet the seemingly normative de-
liberation theory, for instance, when Jürgen Habermas, in his “Theory of Commu-
nicative Action”, time and again refers to Parsons (Habermas 1984-87). In his 
world famous book “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”, he 
claims that media should not be arbitrary constructors of reality, but enable “bour-
geois reasoning”, and a public sphere that informs the people, probably also serves 
as a “Fourth Estate” (Habermas 1991). Habermas argues that journalism should 
help society to define and solve its problems. Now, objective “problems” in the 
sense of Habermas are “differences” between a system and its environments like 
those heralded by the functionalist systems theory, but on an intersubjective rather 
than a subjective basis. The interactions between a system and its environments 
and their mutual influences on each other create the real core of intersubjectivity. 
 
The liberal democratic theory of the public sphere and the (neoliberal) functional-
ist version of systems theory are complete antidotes in this respect. “Objectivity”, 
according to Habermas, is what societies as a whole consider to be problems, ei-
ther defined by science or public consensus. Truthfulness is important for the me-
dia. Reality checks are possible and needed. Media output therefore is “news”. 
News must be solid information and, what is more, meaningful information – let 
us call it “knowledge”. News must be meaningful knowledge circulated to enable 
societies to function as democracies. The task of the journalist is to be investigative 
– seek reality, not absolute reality, but intersubjective visions of reality, including 
the limitations of knowledge, the “known unknowns”, as the outer limitations of 
our knowledge societies (Innerarity 2013). The “differences” media should create 
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from the perspective of democratic deliberation theory are therefore not only in-
tersubjective and meaningful, but also rational. 
 
It is immediately clear that right-wing populism might be an ideal candidate for 
functionalist media theory, but it is also the complete antidote to rational delibera-
tion theory. “Fake news” is a populist political strategy. Stereotypical hate speech 
about women and minorities is flagrant. For Trump, Twitter messages replace po-
litical programs. The representatives of the AfD in German federal parliaments are 
known for their lack of expertise. It is truly not easy to capture the rational essence 
of populism. Even when populism is covered in a critical way, massive and early 
media coverage ennobles such movements and lifts them into the status of serious 
political projects; but the media are, in fact, rather premature in doing so. In all 
these facets, right-wing populism is the opposite of what Habermas considered the 
public sphere to be. Seen from this perspective, the media coverage of the right-
wing is indeed an illegitimate neoliberal response and an artificial hype about a po-
litical movement.  
 
 
Democratic representation theory 
 
However, the story is a bit more complicated. There is another way of looking at 
democratic media theory. The core concepts here are “representation” and “bal-
ance”. Public sphere theory started as an elitist top-down information model in the 
early 20th century. During the Lippmann-Dewey controversy in the 1920s, Walter 
Lippmann, for instance, formulated his then mainstream views of the role of the 
political class, in particular, to educate people (rather than leading a dialogue with 
them) (Beierwaltes 2000). This perception was widened after the Second World 
War to include mass organizations like political parties, trade unions. Beginning 
with the 1960s and with people like Habermas, the public sphere was meant to in-
clude the whole of civil society. Habermas himself reacted to his leftist and femi-
nist critics, who bemoaned his too narrow focus on “bourgeois” reasoning in his 
earlier work, by extending the public sphere to the social peripheries (Habermas 
1996). In particular, the Internet was thereafter heralded as a massive chance for 
the integration of more and more people into public debates. The peripheries of 
the public sphere have increasingly become the new centers.  
 
The way of dealing with multiple voices in journalism is what we call “balance”. 
However, there is an internal conflict between the norms of “objectivity” and of 
“balance”. We easily speak of “balanced and objective or neutral journalism”, but 
often ignore the complexity of this conceptual marriage. Rational objectivity bur-
dens the journalist with a complex search for facts and intersubjective constructs 
of reality. However, facts and (scientific) truths often lie beyond the existing dis-
course (just think of Galileo Galilei). Therefore, contradictions might arise between 
objective and balanced reporting. Representing articulated voices in society can 
create enormous and often systematically propagandist distractions from “the 
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truth”, often considered as “false balances” (Boykoff/Boykoff 2004). Balance 
therefore can be the enemy of objectivity and neutrality.  
 
This dilemma, more than pure resort to neoliberalism and systems theory, ex-
plains the confusion about whether or not to cover right-wing populists. From the 
perspective of objectivity, coverage might be illegitimate – but from a perspective 
of representation and balance, reporting is often a necessity. Journalists must re-
port about populists after they are elected into parliaments and offices because 
they are backed by voters. Prior to the elections legitimacy is usually lower, as in 
the case of Trump, who received clearly too much attention although he was only 
one of many Republican candidates. It is also questionable whether right-wing 
populists are social movements which need to be covered. The nature of right-wing 
support differs from country to country, and, at least in Germany, it is very often 
not the poor who vote for respective parties, but rather members of the middle 
class, who want to utter their protest against migrants, refugees and globalization. 
Right-wing (racist) movements, however, are usually not considered to be social 
movements, since they oppose basic norms of human rights. Quite like many Is-
lamist groups, they must be considered to remain outside the realm of civil society. 
They are rather radical protest movements in opposition to core values to civil so-
ciety. 
 
However, quite ironically it is the leftist liberal idea of integrating peripheral voices 
into the public sphere that lends legitimacy to the representation of the new right. 
Liberal theory which was designed to widen the social spectrum is turned against 
itself by the illiberal right. Liberal theory can reject hate speech as a violation of the 
ground rules of public debate; but it must also protect the participation of civilized 
deliberations of the radical right. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What remains in the end is a rather complicated situation. We must admit that 
coverage of the right-wing has a certain integrative function for all those who have 
turned their back on democracy. However, the question remains: integration into 
what? A post-truth political culture of public debate? In contrast to functionalist 
media theory, rational deliberation theory is to be interpreted as a complete rebut-
tal of the irrational character of populism. The argument here would be that we 
must not allow the media be dominated by irrational debates. At the same time, we 
should admit that democratic media theory is all but uniform in dealing with the 
phenomenon. Left-liberal public sphere theory is in tune with the anti-elitist and 
radical post-modern inclusion of complete civil societies.  
 
In the end, it seems that there is as much reason for the mass media to cover as 
there is to systematically ignore and boycott populism. The risk of slipping into 
post-truth conditions that are eroding democracy must be weighed up against the 
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dwindling trust and integration of those who follow the new right. Functionalist 
news values and the sensationalist coverage of right-wing populism, however, 
should be characterized as what they really are: neoliberals playing around with a 
dangerous political movement. 
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